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A. INTRODUCTION
The argument of this paper is that competition should be perceived as a sui generis
right. The paper develops this argument from three perspectives: substantive,
methodological and comparative. On the substantive side it explains why
competition should be conceptually treated as the central goal of antitrust policy
and investigates potential situations where protection of competition conflicts
with consumer welfare.
The paper makes a case for a methodological “unbundling” of those closely
connected economic values. By exploring the essence of competition and its
importance for the market, the paper explains how the idea of competition
transforms from a means to an end, or rather how by being a legally defined
means it procedurally becomes an end.1 It develops its theoretical argument
primarily in the European jurisdictional ambit, acknowledging that its
conceptual implications can be relevant for other jurisdictions as well.
On the comparative side it makes an attempt at applying to the antitrust domain
several techniques developed in legal theory and political philosophy. It
demonstrates how these disciplines reconcile the inevitable conflicts between free
speech on one hand and public morality and welfare on the other. Given that
competition in its economic sense is a relatively new area, whereas the political
aspects of freedom have a very long intellectual tradition, antitrust can only
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benefit from exploring the ways in which legal theory and political philosophy
are debating the political and cultural aspects of competition. By drawing a
parallel between competition and freedom of speech, the paper shows why the
same approach is necessary to solve the discrepancy between competition and
consumer welfare. The consequences of defining competition as an independent
economic value are not only academic. On a practical level they can lead to
exempting some types of restrictive conduct from antitrust sanctions under a
new standard.
It is beyond the limits of this paper to discuss the importance of such
economic values as consumer welfare, industrial growth, market integration or
innovation. The paper does not explore the role of competition in the process of
achieving these economic goods either. It also leaves aside ideological tensions
between the different types of welfare, perceiving both consumer welfare and
total welfare as utilitarian values, which are opposed to an understanding of
competition in its deontological sense. In contributing to the argument that
competition deserves protection in its own right this paper does not diminish the
importance of welfare-centric values. It treats their relation with competition as
a par-in-parem. This enables the various interested parties to persuade the
decision-maker of the importance of each particular value in each particular
case via the adversarial adjudicative process.
The paper develops its core argument in 12 sections structured in three parts:
I Positive analysis; II Normative proposal; and III Operationalisation. Section B
illustrates the traditional justification for the utilitarian perception of competition
and analyses its main weaknesses. Section C explores conceptual differences and
underlines the fundamental similarities of the two major deontological antitrust
schools (Austrian and Ordoliberal). Section D provides some conceptual
argumentation for the treatment of competition as a constitutional value.
Section E introduces the theoretical framework of value pluralism which
reconciles the conflicts between constitutional values. The methodology of value
pluralism is applied in order to balance the value of competition with the
interests of welfare. Section F opens the second part of the paper. It explores
competition as the essence of liberal democracy, claiming that the economic
aspects of competition together with its political (elections) and cultural (free
speech) elements constitute the core of democratic governance. Accordingly,
these values should be protected as a matter of evolutionary choice of society
without any utility-based verification. Section G conceptualises the ‘Oroboros
dilemma’ of self-destructive freedom and democracy, which is described in the
domain of competition by Robert Bork as the ‘antitrust paradox: a policy at war
with itself ’. Section H continues the comparative analysis of competition. It
explores regulatory practices developed for the protection of free elections
(political competition) and free speech (cultural competition) on one hand and
economic competition on the other. It reveals the main methodological error of
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antitrust, which prevents immunisation of some anticompetitive practices from
sanctions on non-utilitarian grounds. This section concludes that, unlike its
political and cultural counterparts, economic competition is gradually
transforming into a purely instrumental consequentialist policy which
corresponds neither to the semantics nor even to the syntax of the term ‘compe-
tition’. The logic of such transformation is a direct consequence of the
above-mentioned methodological inconsistency between economic competition
on one hand and the political and cultural aspects of competition on the other.
Section I develops the argument that in certain situations anticompetitive
agreements are immunised from antitrust sanctions provided that they simulta-
neously promote competition more than they distort it. This possibility exists in
the regulation of the political and cultural aspects of competition, but it is
missing in the economic context. The current structure of Article 101(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not envisage
this option. Therefore in practice courts tend to develop indirect ways of
granting immunity to undertakings which cannot conform to the rigid utilitarian
requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. While acceptable, this solution is far from
optimal. For this reason the section proposes a conceptual amendment of Article
101 TFEU. This proposal is designed as a contribution to the academic debate
on the role of the competitive process in antitrust rather than as a direct call for
changes in primary European law. Section J clarifies that the proposed
deontological benchmark for competition does not diminish the importance of
utilitarian values since the proposal merely extends the current regulatory
framework without substituting any of its existing parts. The application of the
amended Article 101 (3) TFEU would still be based upon the discretion of the
decision-maker. The will of the decision-maker (be it the Commission, national
authorities or courts) constitutes the central part of this section. It analyses the
balancing techniques, developed by the legal and constitutional theories and
implements them into the area of antitrust. Section K continues the analysis of
the balancing act, dealing specifically with the technique of separation of
different values. It proposes a two-step methodology of balancing. The first one
is purely value-centric. It artificially isolates each value from all others in order to
undertake their independent analysis which helps to understand the internal
essence of each value separately. The second consecutive step recontextualises
previously isolated values into the main regulatory agenda. This section
demonstrates that the present-day regulatory status of competition does not
enable it to be in the par-in-parem relationships with other values, because all
balancing acts are performed as a one-step analysis: each value is only balanced
against the others at the external level, where the one with the higher
importance always prevails. This section is designed to provide the operational
justification for the normative proposal developed in Section I. The last section
summarises the main findings of the paper.
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PART I
B. THE UTILITARIAN UNDERSTANDING OF COMPETITION
There are two conceptual approaches to understanding competition: utilitarian
and deontological.2 According to the utilitarian vision, competition is not worth
much; it is welfare that really matters in the economy.3 Deontologists, on the
contrary, submit that competition should be protected and fostered with no direct
subordination to its eventual outcomes,4 but as an important element of
freedom.5 The former view is encompassed into the Benthamite idea of social
welfare; the latter into the Kantian categorical imperative. Therefore, both
approaches are based on strong theoretical foundations.
In spite of the existence of different forms of utilitarianism (inter alia,
rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism), this paper assumes that all utilitarian
justifications for competition are in some sense consequentialist (ends-justify-
means type of reasoning) and subsequently it uses the terms ‘consequentialism’
and ‘utilitarianism’ interchangeably.6 A similar taxonomy has been introduced to
the area of antitrust by Black,7 though he implies that the consequentialist view
encourages ‘the survival of the economically fittest’ and the deontological
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2 On the doctrinal correlation between these two approaches, see the polemics between RM
Dworkin and RA Posner: RM Dworkin, “Is Wealth a Value?” (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191;
RA Posner, “The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman” (1980) 9 Journal of
Legal Studies 243.
3 J Vickers, “Competition is for Consumers” (2002) A Speech to the Social Market Foundation,
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0102.pdf (accessed on 4 August 2010) 1, 5: “Com-
petition is increasingly being recognised as a core consumer issue . . . Competition is not an end in
itself but a process that advances goals of economic well being, ultimately for consumers.”
4 FA Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure” in FA Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics, and the History of Ideas (London, Taylor & Francis, 1978), 180:
“[C]ompetition is valuable only because, and so far as, its results are unpredictable and on the
whole different from those which anyone has, or could have, deliberately aimed at . . . [T]he
generally beneficial effects of competition must include disappointing or defeating some
particular expectations or intentions.”
5 DJ Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1998):
“The genesis of the idea of protecting competition was imbedded in the idea of protecting
freedom, and thus it is important to review . . . the role and substance of the concept of
freedom . . . The institutions and traditions of liberalism not only scripted thinking about
economic competition, but also carried its political fortunes’.
6 Since the term “utilitarian” is used in this paper in a broader sense, it also embraces the Posnerian
notion of wealth maximisation, although Posner himself distinguishes his approach from classical
(happiness maximising) utilitarianism (RA Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory”
(1979) 8 The Journal of Legal Studies). This paper treats them together since both kinds of
utilitarianism are result-oriented, as opposed to deontological approaches, which are
process-oriented.
7 O Black, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
approach embodies ‘certain moral rights or political liberties’.8 Accordingly,
consumer welfare could be seen in Black’s model from the deontological
perspective because it is not always achievable via a process of natural selection.
The classification applied in this paper is fundamentally different. The criterion
for separation between the deontological and consequentialist views is based
upon their perception of competition itself rather than upon motives that are
external to the phenomenon of competition. Thus such result-oriented views on
the role of competition between consumer welfare or total welfare are always
seen as utilitarian, whereas the perceptions of competition as an independent
societal value are taken to be deontological.
The utilitarian vision of competition dominates both in theory and practice.
Thus in the notes to their influential book Fairness vs Welfare,9 Kaplow and
Shavell explicitly claim that “social policies should be assessed entirely on the
basis of how they affect individuals’ well-being. This claim implies that no
independent weight should be granted to deontological principles.”10 A similar
vision is supported by all the main neoclassical antitrust schools. Accordingly, the
representatives of the Chicago School, which introduced a “more-economic
approach” to the area of antitrust, argue that the sole goal of competition law is
promotion of total welfare. This position can be defined as “right-utilitar-
ianism”. Although ideologically similar to laissez-faire non-interventionism, the
Chicago School perceives competition in its instrumental sense, as a way to
generate total welfare. The main narrative of the European Commission,
developed de facto into the Neo-Brussels School, is that competition should serve
the interests of consumers (ie “left-utilitarianism”). The ethos of “consumer
welfare” with its powerful redistributive rhetoric has recently replaced the
previous European benchmark of competition law—market integration (Old-
Brussels School or utilitarian federalism), which claimed that European antitrust
policy should be performed through the prism of market integration.
Non-interventionists claim that competition is a useful tool to promote
innovation (the Schumpeterian school or libertarian utilitarianism); industrialists
submit that competition policy and law should be driven by the interests of
national champions at the international level.
In spite of substantial ideological and methodological differences, all the
above-mentioned perceptions of competition share one important character:
none of them sees competition as an independent economic value. Competition
is perceived here in its applied, instrumentalised form, as a way to achieve
something which ipso facto has a higher value than competition itself. The
importance of the utilitarian perception of competition is beyond dispute.
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8 Ibid, 33–61.
9 L Kaplow and S Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002).
10 L Kaplow and S Shavell, “Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological Principles” (2004) The
Harvard John M Olin Discussion Paper Series No 460, 2.
However, the question remains “the importance” for “what”? An instru-
mentalised competition policy can indeed be beneficial for welfare, innovation,
industrial growth and market integration. But should it constitute the core of
antitrust analysis? Does it fill in the whole value spectrum of competition? Does
not competition itself constitute an important societal interest which could be
seen independently from its welfare-maximising effects? Isn’t it for consumer
policy to deal with the interests of consumers? Should industrial, innovation and
market integration policies not deal with their respective goals by themselves?
The utilitarian vision of competition is therefore contestable.11 If utilitarian
goals, such as consumer welfare or efficiency, are considered to be the only
reason for antitrust policy to exist, then antitrust policy becomes consequentialist
(ends-justify-means type of reasoning). In this case the very principle of a free
market with undistorted competition is under threat. Whenever a greater
efficiency can be achieved through dirigistic regulatory practices (understood in
this context as the practices that go against the free market), competition
standards would be considered as an obstacle for generating efficiency, thereby
loosing any economic justification, legitimacy and, eventually, legality.12 Indeed,
some authors claim that any attempt to raise the importance of consumer
welfare at the constitutional level by instrumentalising the existing competition
rules is contra legem et contra constitutionem.13
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11 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), 258: “[I]f in cases of collision all reasons can assume the
character of policy arguments, then the fire wall erected in legal discourse by a deontological
understanding of legal norms and principles collapses.”
12 J Wolff, “The Ethics of Competition” in G Parry, H Steiner and A Qureshi (eds), The Legal and
Moral Aspects of International Trade: Freedom and Trade, vol 3 (London, Routledge, 1998), 84, 89:
“It would be a mistake to conclude that acting competitively is wrong: perhaps there are
stronger counter-arguments. Yet we have enough to motivate the thought that competition in
general, and economic competition in particular, is morally problematic . . . Perhaps we have
become so used to the idea that these private vices generate greatly outweighing public virtues
that we take the moral argument against competition to have been answered long ago. This,
then, is to see the case for competition to be made out in consequentialist terms, and the
argument is surely impressive: competition keeps prices down, quality up, and facilitates
efficient employment of resources.”
After subordinating competition to the outcomes which it is capable of generating, it becomes an
easy task for the author to destroy the societal value of competition, concluding that it is a
consequence of “a vastly misleading romanticism of the economic world”.
13 R Zäch and A Künzler, “Freedom to Compete or Consumer Welfare: The Goal of Competition
Law according to Constitutional Law” in R Zäch, A Heinemann and A Kellerhals (eds), The
Development of Competition Law—Global Perspective (London, Edward Elgar, 2010), 76:
“The ultimate consequence of the ‘more economic approach’ would be that competitors, by
engaging in competition, would no longer be serving their own freely chosen purposes but,
instead, a collective economic purpose, consumer welfare. At this point, the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of competition would be instrumentalised. Instances of the
instrumentalisation of fundamental basic rights tend to be found in societies organised on
socialist principles and/or in centrally planned economies where governmental agencies have
C. THE DEONTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMPETITION
Concerns with the instrumentalisation of competition by utilitarian antitrust
theories have been raised by deontological competition scholars. They claimed
that an applied vision of competition inevitably diminishes its societal
importance. Most of the defendants of the deontological view on competition
develop their ideas within the tradition of the Austrian and the Ordoliberal
schools.
These two schools are substantially divided in their perception of the role of
competition in economic life and even more explicitly on the mechanisms
applied by states in order to establish, maintain, protect and promote
competition. Leaving aside the historical and cultural contexts within which the
two schools have developed their main theses, the main discrepancies between
them can be reduced to three major conceptual disagreements. Acknowledging
the independent status of competition in the economic life of liberal democracy,
they disagree (1) on the role of the state in this process; (2) on the ontological
aspects of competition as an individual right; and (3) on the ontological aspects of
competition as a collective right.
(1) The ideas developed by the Austrian school are based upon the deep
ideological roots of laissez-faire individualism. They conceive of competition in
terms of the Freudian libido, natural instinct of economic life, Hayekian
“competition as a discovery process”, or Darwinian “competition as a nature’s
God”. Unlike mainstream neoclassical schools, Austrians see competition as a
process of spontaneous interaction, inspired by the entrepreneurial endeavours
of individuals.14 The dynamism and unpredictability of this conception of
competition distinguish it from most of the other antitrust schools. According to
Hayek, “Freedom granted only when it is known beforehand that its effects will
be beneficial is not freedom.”15 The Austrians are known to be strong advocates
of the minimalist state, claiming that the invisibility of the market’s hand cannot
be replaced or even improved by the rational actions of policy-makers.16
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to decide which economic behaviour will in the future have positive results for society
(result-oriented approach).”
14 IM Kirzner, How Markets Work: Disequilibrium, Entrepreneurship and Discovery (London, Institute of
Economic Affairs, 1997), 39:
“Mainstream theory left entrepreneurship out of its picture because entrepreneurship seems
chaotic and unpredictable. . . . In order to perceive regularities amidst the apparently chaotic
vagaries of real-world market volatility, it may seem methodologically sound to imagine a
world with no scope for entrepreneurship. Yet, paradoxically, exactly the opposite is the case.
It is only when entrepreneurship is introduced that we begin to appreciate how and why
markets work.”
15 FA Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 31.
16 Kirzner criticises the mainstream neoclassical antitrust theories and blames them for attempting to
rationalise something which is by definition non-rational: “In the neoclassical world, decision
The Ordoliberal thought, predetermined by the tragic experience of the
Second World War, is much more sceptical in its assessment of the capacity of
the unregulated economy to be self-sufficient or even sustainable. The German
political laissez-faire system with free elections had demonstrated in 1933 how
easily it can be misused by populists. The same danger was anticipated by the
Ordoliberals in the economic context. According to them, competition cannot
exist without strong regulatory interventions by the state, which should prevent
any abuse of this delicate model. However, reliance on interventionalist methods
should not be seen as an attempt to diminish the role of competition but rather
as a form of recognition of its fragility and vulnerability.
(2) The second difference between the two deontological schools is closely tied
to the former. While both agree that competition should be seen as an individual
right, they perceive the essence of this right differently. According to the
Ordoliberals, every economic actor possesses a relative claim to enter the market
in order to exercise her right to compete. The right to participate in the
competitive process must not be jeopardised either by the state or by more
successful individuals or undertakings. Therefore, the importance of the market’s
structure plays a pivotal role in their thought.17 For the same reasons the
Ordoliberal antitrust policy is very suspicious of cartels and monopolies.
Contrastingly, the Austrians claim that the right to compete should be primarily
interpreted as the right to benefit from commercial success, achieved by an
entrepreneur by using her individual skills and endeavour. As a result, states
should be more tolerant towards monopolies and cartels, because both constitute
natural outcomes of successful economic activities. The Ordoliberals are thus
interested in protecting the individual rights of weaker agents (left-deontology),
while the Austrians are striving to promote the individual rights of stronger
market players (right-deontology).
(3) Finally, the views of the Austrians and Ordoliberals differ at the level of
their perception of competition as a collective right. The Austrian school claims
that the principles of economic individualism and spontaneous order are, in the
long run, capable of delivering benefits to the whole society. Rich and successful
undertakings are intuitively interested in sharing their wealth with others in
order to maintain economic and social stability. Furthermore, open markets
always enable the free entrance of innovative ideas. This would promote
economic progress and impel successful companies not only to benefit from their
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makers know what they are ignorant about. One is never surprised” (IM Kirzner,
“Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach” (1997)
35 Journal of Economic Literature 64).
17 W Eucken, “The Competitive Order and its Implementation” (trans C Ahlborn and C Grave)
(2005) 2 Competition Policy International 224: “In contrast to the policy of the laissez-faire, the central
task of the [Ordoliberal] economic policy is the creation of conditions within an industrialised
economy which allow the development of functioning and humane economic orders.”
current status but also to constantly improve their commercial strategies. From
the Ordoliberal perspective, which in its generic sense was adopted as the
German post-war social-market economic model,18 free competition as a
collective right should be predetermined by strong redistributive elements. This
balance between the market ethos and social concerns requires some active
regulatory control and proper institutional design.19
In spite of all these differences between the Austrian and Ordoliberal schools,
their conceptual similarities are more important for this paper. Methodologically,
both perceive the phenomenon of competition separately from the outcomes
which competition can eventually generate. Both submit that in some cases
competition should be protected as an independent economic value. This implies
the conceptual recognition of situations where competition can be protected
even though it does not generate any measurable economic benefits and
sometimes even if such benefits are diminished or sacrificed. Competition is
therefore protected as a matter of evolutionary choice and an important societal
value. No value and no right would pass the test of efficiency each and every
time. Otherwise, there would be no necessity to protect them, they would be
self-executable.20 If competition is seen in its deontological dimension, then there
is no need to prove its economic efficiency at each and every moment. After
being granted the status of societal value, competition begins to be recognised
per se. Public values are not protected because they are always efficient, and they
should not stop being protected just because sometimes they are inefficient.
Therefore, as soon as competition manages to pass through the crucible of time
and transform itself into a societal value, it no longer needs to be subordinated
to a permanent efficiency check.
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION
The decisive question to address is whether competition should be considered as
a public value or merely as a tool to increase “more important” utilitarian
economic values (eg total welfare, consumer welfare, industrial growth, market
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18 On the nuances and the historical background of the term “social-market economy”, see VJ
Vanberg, “The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism” (2004) Freiburg Discussion
Papers on Constitutional Economics No 04/11.
19 JP Bladel, “Against Polanyi-Centrism: Hayek and the Re-emergence of ‘Spontaneous Order’”
(2005) 8 Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 22: “Hayek respected Eucken greatly, but Eucken
and the Ordo-liberals were too inclined towards rationalist constructivism to embrace
spontaneous order.”
20 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978), 333:
“There would be no point in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that involved
some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits
our country would receive from overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient.”
integration, innovations). The dominant view supports the latter approach.21
According to Bork, ‘if the achievement and maintenance of competitive
processes . . . means preserving rivalry for its own sake, there seems to be no
point in it’.22 To prove the opposite, it is necessary to show that competition as a
process can be seen as an important (constitutional) value of liberal democracy.
The notion of constitutionality is taken in this paper in its broader sense.23
This inter alia implies that the essence of rights and the scope of their recognition
cannot be diminished simply by making changes in positive law. In order to
protect certain societal priorities of a polity, constitutionality does not necessarily
have to be embedded into a written constitution.24 This hermeneutical nature of
constitutionality is tied to the metaphysical rationale of a given political
community. It pays much less attention to the historical method of interpretation
and the “real” intentions of its “founding fathers”. Thus in the European
context the recent transfer of public commitments to protect competition from
Article 3(g) EC to the Protocol (No 27) on the Internal Market and Competition
should not be seen as a change which substantially affects the post-Lisbon status
of competition.25
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21 A Jones and B Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 3rd
edn, 2008), 1–2:
“States which adopt a market economy do so because, on the basis of neoliberal economic
theory, they consider it to be the form of economic organisation which brings the greatest
benefits to society. The basis of a free market is competition between firms because such
competition is believed . . . to deliver efficiency, low prices, and innovation.”
22 RH Bork, “The Goals of Antitrust Policy” (1967) 57 American Economic Review 252.
23 JB Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002), 1:
“[There is a] tendency among competition specialists to treat their topic . . . as distinct from the
economic constitutional law of the Community. As the law now stands, however, the
competition rules contained in the Treaty have a constitutional status and may be interpreted
as shaping a law of economic liberty from restraints of competition and abuses of private
economic power, not only a law of economic efficiency. Thus, an efficiency-oriented approach
to the Community competition rules may not be in tune with the current normative structure.”
24 J Gardner, “Can There Be a Written Constitution?” (2009) University of Oxford Legal Research
Paper Series No 17, 1: “Does the United Kingdom have a constitution? Some people doubt it. But
there is no room for doubt. A constitution is a conceptual necessity of every legal system.”
25 This paper does not explore the further political outcomes of shifting competition from the main
body of the Treaty to one of its Protocols, but considers this modification as a logistic technicality
or a mere symbolic gesture with no meaningful legal consequences. For the analysis of the
post-Lisbon status of competition, see J Drexl, “Competition Law as Part of the European
Constitution” in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 2nd edn, 2010):
“The existence of this new provision can be explained through comparison with the existing
regulation on the objectives in the EC Treaty. Article 3(3) TEU-Lis functionally corresponds to
Article 2 EC and not to Article 3 EC. In Article 2 EC, the Treaty refers to the establishment of
the ‘common market’ without mentioning the protection of competition as one of the
Community’s objectives. Article 3(3) TEU-Lis follows this approach but replaces the outmoded
term of the ‘common market’ with the term ‘internal market’. Since it had been decided that
Article 3 EC in its present form should not reappear in the new Treaty, the reference to the
Above all, the ideals of liberal democracy, of which—as will be
argued—competition is a central component, are recognised in the Preamble of
the Treaty on the European Union. The references to the “humanist inheritance
of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the
rule of law”26 and the “attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”27 can serve as examples of
the “constitutional” significance of competition in the European context. In
addition, the structure of Article 101(1), which prohibits not only the creation of
negative consequences from the perspective of competition but even the very
intent thereof, shows the importance of the competitive process for the
European Union. This view has been partly supported by the case law of the
European Courts from Grundig28 to GlaxoSmithKline.29
Acknowledging that the economic, political and cultural aspects of
competition constitute the essence of liberal democracy and freedom, the
“constitutional” status of competition can be found in Article 2 of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU): “The Union is founded on the values of respect for . . .
freedom [and] democracy.’
The references to democratic humanistic values are included in the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which acknowledges the
Union’s awareness of “its spiritual and moral heritage“ founded “on the
indivisible, universal values of . . . freedom [and] democracy” and “places the
individual at the heart of its activities”.30 These references can be read along the
lines of the Ordoliberal and Austrian traditions which show that competition
constitutes the core of individual economic freedom.
In addition, the values of liberal democracy are inherently encompassed in
the constitutional tradition as well as in the legislation of all Member States.
This can mitigate their jurisdictional claims on competence. By recognising the
deontological value of competition, the European Treaties accept that freedom
and welfare are two incommensurable domains31 with no direct subordination of
the former to the latter.
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protection of competition had initially been deleted from the Treaty text accidentally and
without further consideration. It seems as if the French resistance towards the reintroduction
of ‘undistorted competition’ in Article 3(3) TEU-Lis only developed after realising this
‘accident’.”
26 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2010] OJ C 83/01.
27 Ibid.
28 Joint cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, para 7.
29 Case C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2009] OJ C282, 21 November, 2, para 63.
30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/02.
31 On the dialectical nature of commensurability debates in legal theory, see JL Schroeder, “Apples
and Oranges: The Commensurability Debate in Legal Scholarship” (2002) 48 Cardozo Law School
Research Paper Series.
Finally, in a purely legal sense, the principle of an open32 market economy
with free competition is still contained in Article 119(1) TFEU33 as a tool to
achieve the purposes of the European integration project. By being articulated
so explicitly in the TFEU, free competition could already be perceived as an
independent value. In other words, the goals of the EU cannot be reached by
means which deviate from (let alone are incompatible with) the principle of an
open market economy with free competition.
For these deontological reasons, the phenomenon of competition can legiti-
mately be separated from the outcomes which it generates, since it does not
receive its validity from its eventual utilitarian effectiveness, but primarily as a
matter of principle. Therefore, competition is protected as an evolutionary
choice of society. It is neither the best nor the optimal way to create wealth—be it
consumer or total welfare, industrial growth or innovation. From a utilitarian
perspective, competition is not indispensable. Arguably, there are other ways to
generate welfare. The reason to protect the ethos of competition lies in a
different dimension. It belongs to one of the fundamental rights, developed by
the philosophical, moral and constitutional traditions of liberal democracies.
E. COMPETITION AND VALUE PLURALISM
The recognition of the “constitutional” status of competition by no means
implies its hierarchical superiority to other societal values such as consumer
welfare. Constitutionality does not guarantee absolute protection. This paper
recognises that each societal value has been accepted in one way or another at
the constitutional and institutional level.34 Moreover, the advocates of these
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32 The premise of this paper is that the notion of “open market” is a synonym for “free market”. It
leaves aside the restrictive interpretation of the “openness” of the market as being only relevant for
the purpose of designing an internal market as a federalist integration project.
33 Art 119(1) TFEU provides that “For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union, the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the
Treaties, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member
States’ economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and
conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.”
34 AS Sweet and J Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 89:
“A court that explicitly acknowledges that balancing inheres in rights adjudication is a more
honest court than one that claims that it only enforces a constitutional code, but neither
balances nor makes law. It also makes itself better off strategically, relative to alternatives. The
move to balancing makes it clear: (a) that each party is pleading a constitutionally-legitimate
norm or value; (b) that, a priori, the court holds each of these interests in equally high esteem;
(c) that determining which value shall prevail in any given case is not a mechanical exercise, but
is a difficult judicial task involving complex policy considerations; and (d) that future cases
pitting the same two legal interests against one another may well be decided differently,
depending on the facts.”
values can also find both legal and conceptual justification for their values to be
protected at the “constitutional” level. This acceptance, however, merely reflects
public recognition of that value. Democratic societies tend to acknowledge the
futility of a clear-cut homogeneous hierarchy of values. Any attempt to develop
such a constant subordination of societal priorities paves the way to authoritar-
ianism. The scope of the recognised “constitutional” values is much broader
than the regulatory capacity to fully protect every aspect of them.
Each socially significant fact is composed of a unique constellation of
different conflicting values; therefore its complete regulatory scheduling is hardly
possible to foresee. The hierarchical relationship between the different
deontological and utilitarian values is one of mutual subordination. This
situation creates a “rock–paper–scissors” game-theoretical effect: depending on
the context, which is per se unpredictable and inductive, each value can
outweigh another, while being simultaneously outweighed by a third one, which
in turn outweighs the second one. This interaction composes a closed spiral
circle.
In addition, each situation is predetermined by a dice-game effect where the
decision of the regulator depends on the amount of “regulatory units” which
every value has managed to claim on the universal value scale. The kaleidoscopic
reality is then unpredictable ex ante. These characteristics of the regulatory reality
are accepted as inevitable by liberal democracies. They constitute a well-known
philosophical problem, depicted in the notion of “tragic choice”. As Galston
submits, objective goods cannot be fully ranked or ordered:
“[T]here is no common measure of value for all goods, which are qualitatively
heterogeneous. . . . There are no ‘lexical orderings’ among types of goods. And there
is no ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ but, rather, a range of public values the
relative importance of which will depend on particular circumstances.”35
One of the central claims of legal pluralists is that values constantly collide.
Furthermore, as Maduro argues, “constitutional pluralism should not be seen
simply as a solution, be it pragmatic or normative, to the problem of conflicting
constitutional claims. Rather it should be conceived as something which is
inherent in the theory of constitutionalism itself.”36 General legal theory
acknowledges this clash in the notion of “hard cases”.37 Dworkin’s famous
metaphor of the ideal Judge Hercules, who can eventually uncover “the right
answer” to any legal case,38 represents a monistic perception of the adjudicative
process. From a pluralistic perspective, even if he were to devote all his powers to
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36 MP Maduro, “What Is Constitutional Pluralism?” in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds), “Four
Visions of Constitutional Pluralism” (2008) European University Institute Working Paper, Law
No 21, 5.
37 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1997).
finding “the right answer”, Judge Hercules would become a victim of his own
strength, simultaneously discovering all powerful counterarguments, hence
transforming himself from Hercules into Sisyphus. Therefore, in order to
reconcile conflicting values, each decision-maker inevitably has to undertake
difficult choices. This implies that some values will be de-prioritised despite their
significance. It is in the very nature of the adversarial process that it enables the
promoters of each value to persuade the decision-maker of the societal or
institutional importance of each value in each particular case.
The incommensurability of values in liberal democracies has been explored
at the philosophical level by value pluralists.39 The task of each decision-maker is
predetermined by John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” or HLA Hart’s “penumbra”
which prevents the possibility of making ultimate judgements. Value pluralism
conceptualises the relativity of each act of the decision-making, even though this
relativity does not amount to relativism. Values still hold their internal essence
which predetermined the choice of the decision-maker. Unlike relativism, which
is a negative, deconstructive theory which ultimately justifies a complete
arbitrariness of choice, value pluralism develops the idea of a “bounded” or
“limited” arbitrariness of the decision-maker, which is predetermined and
subordinated by such traditional control mechanisms of liberal democracies as
elections, the separation of powers, free speech and adversarial processes, as well
as the strong implicit influence of the legal culture shared between the actors or
“reflective equilibrium”.40 In one way or another, all these elements contain
strong competitive components. This also shows the pivotal societal role of
competition as an “immune system” of liberal democracy.
The dilemmatic nature of the decision-maker problem is rejected by authori-
tarian regimes, which base their decision-making process upon quasi-religious
commands with homogeneous structures and mutually reconcilable elements.
Authoritarian views therefore support the existence of clarity and predictability
(right v wrong situation). Conversely, liberal democracy recognises the inevita-
bility of making choices between equally important options (right v right
situation). This is the reason why the former model inclines towards inquisitorial
jurisprudence, while the latter is based upon adversarial judicial (and, in a
broader sense, decision-making) processes.
The relevant methodology or balancing act is analysed in the subsequent
parts of this paper. Before this, however, it is necessary to show why economic
competition is so important for liberal democracies. This argument is developed
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39 I Berlin, “On Value Pluralism” (1998) XLV(8) New York Review of Books: “We are doomed to
choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss. The world we encounter in ordinary
experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally absolute, the
realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. . . . The necessity of
choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”
from a comparative perspective. The economic aspects of competition have been
historically so deeply influenced by the utilitarian cost–benefit approach that any
reference to the deontological foundations of competition is seen as irrelevant.
This is not the case for the regulation of the political and cultural aspects of
competition. Both are still predetermined by strong deontological boundaries. In
order to demonstrate that the same could be applied in the area of antitrust, it is
necessary to reveal the conceptual similarities between the political, cultural and
economic aspects of competition.
PART II
F. THREE DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Aside from its economic dimension, competition is present in the political and
cultural contexts.41 In fact, competition is an indispensable attribute of
democracy,42 although not an indispensable attribute of governance. Arguably,
many societies can efficiently develop their economic, cultural and political
activities on the basis of authoritarian principles of administration with no or
only some minimal competition. The present-day economic performances of
countries with planned economies and rapid development of the notion of
“authoritarian capitalism” against the background of the financial crisis can
serve as recent examples thereof. In this sense, competition should be seen as a
“luxury product” which is accepted as a distinctive attribute of liberal
democracy. It is not being abandoned every time the markets fail. Competition is
recognised as a matter of principle rather than necessity.
All three aspects of competition are inherently protected in all democratic
polities.43 Thus in politics the competitive process is reflected in the elections,
where political parties “compete” by offering ideologies and programmes for
their constituencies. In a cultural sense competition is encompassed in the notion
of “free speech”, by which individuals and groups freely express their views and
opinions. For a long time free speech has been seen as a “marketplace of
ideas”,44 which holds that the solution to many problems arises out of the
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42 G Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997).
43 PJ McNulty, “Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition” (1968) 82 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 639: “[C]ompetition is, in our system, a political and social desideratum no less than an
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44 The concept of the “marketplace of ideas” was originally borrowed by the legal discourse from
two decisions of the US Supreme Court in Abrams v United States, 250 US 616 (1919) and Keyishian v
Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 605–06 (1967).
tensions that exist between different views. Society as a whole benefits from the
circulation of thoughts that can be seen as a “competition” of ideas.45 Finally, in
its economic sense, competition is present in the idea of free markets. Thereby
the notions of elections, free speech and markets can be seen as the political,
cultural and economic aspects of competition, respectively.
The political, cultural and economic dimensions of competition are equally
important for a healthy democracy. None of them should be justified by
efficiency benchmarks.46 In politics we do not simply appoint “the best” or “the
most effective” party to govern the country as in enlightened absolutism. We do
not select only “the best” or “the most useful” ideas to be freely circulated inside
the community. The very notion of competition and freedom automatically
implies certain redundancies and inefficiencies. However, their existence does
not provide a sufficient ground for changing the system.
Authoritarianism is a concept starkly opposed to competition. Unlike
competition, it is concerned with final results. The procedure by which they are
obtained is often neglected. The famous credo of authoritarianism is “the end
justifies the means”, whereas for competition the “journey” is more important
than the “destination”. The regulation of economic affairs in an authoritarian
fashion can be successful, whereas reliance on the invisible hand may lead to
failures. This does not mean, however, that the ethos of competition should be
replaced by command control or planned economy. Indeed, economic freedom
usually leads to success. Then again, its success sometimes becomes its biggest
enemy. Economic prosperity can find supporters more rapidly than the notion of
economic freedom. Therefore the latter is often perceived as an instrument to
achieve the former. The maximisation of welfare is neither an unconditional nor
a quintessential feature of freedom. Freedom cannot be seen as a purely rational,
predictable and calculable activity, but rather as a driving force of the entrepre-
neurial discovery.
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Ideas”, (2001) 69 Antitrust Law Journal) is based on the regulation of free speech by antitrust law
rather than on the analysis of the economic aspects of competition in comparison with the political
regulation of free speech.
46 RM Dworkin, “Introduction” in I Hare and J Weinstein (eds), Extreme Speech and Democracy,
(Oxford University Press, 2009):
“If freedom of speech is a basic right, this must be so not in virtue of instrumental arguments,
like Mill’s [‘Mill said that we should tolerate even the speech we hate because truth is most
likely to emerge in a free intellectual combat from which no idea has been excluded’], which
suppose that liberty is important because of its consequences. It must be so for reasons of basic
principle.”
G. THE SELF-DESTRUCTIVE NATURE OF FREE COMPETITION
The deontological aspects of competition constitute its main attractiveness for
liberal democracies.47 At the same time, it constitutes also its biggest vulnerability,
because the competitive process in its pure form cannot conceptually resist any
radical views, since it allows them also “to compete” for being prioritised by
constituencies, individuals and consumers. Liberal democracy itself contains
strong self-destructive elements. Radical views in politics and restrictive conduct
in economics constitute an inherent (though undesirable) part of the competitive
process, even if endowed with all the positive features peculiar to competition. In
this respect, any radical political ideology, as well as any intolerant expression
and any anticompetitive conduct, can claim protection as a matter of freedom.
These practices can be prohibited only after counterbalancing the elements of
freedom which they contain with other important societal values.
For this reason certain “benchmarks of appropriateness” have been drawn
with respect to all three aspects of competition. For instance, political parties
which promote racism or other perverse ideologies are not authorised to
participate in elections. Extreme speech is not allowed as a form of argumen-
tation. No company is permitted to embark on restrictive conduct. These
preventative political, cultural and economic safeguards are called for to avoid
any harm to both democracy and competition. Yet, paradoxically, in an
ontological sense they conflict with the fundamental principles and the very
essence of democracy and competition. This dilemma is permanently faced in
the political, cultural and economic spheres. In antitrust scholarship it has been
captured by Robert Bork in his famous phrase “the antitrust paradox: a policy at
war with itself ”.48
In contrast to economic thought—in which the concept is relatively
new49—the self-contradictory essence of competition has been the object of
continuous investigations in the political and cultural contexts for a long time.
Thereby it became an inherent part of the intellectual tradition dating back to
antiquity (eg the Socratic method of philosophical inquiry; moral dilemmas;
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47 United States v Topco, 405 US 596, 610 (1972): “Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms.”
48 RH Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, The Free Press, 1978).
49 Despite this relative novelty, legal and political philosophers use the “language” of economics to
explain the idea of pluralism. See eg B Baez, Affirmative Action, Hate Speech, and Tenure—Narratives
About Race and Law in the Academy (London, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2001), 50:
“Ironically, the marketplace metaphor, which is rooted in laissez-faire economics, is more effective
for representing speech than for representing the free market system itself.”
tragic choices; enlightened absolutism). Understandably, antitrust can benefit
from the more elaborate solutions offered by legal and political theory.50
The above-mentioned self-destructive elements of competition have their
conceptual solution designed in the form of a three-circled process (Fig 1). The
big (white) circle implies that any conduct in liberal democracy is authorised by
default. The middle (black) circle shows that some of those practices authorised
by default can be prohibited because they significantly encroach upon the (i)
utilitarian or (ii) deontological interests of the polity. The small (grey) circle
demonstrates that those prohibited by the black circle agreements can be
reauthorised (i) on deontological grounds or (ii) on utilitarian grounds after
performing a balancing act.
Along the lines of Fig 1, the reference to liberty and democracy in the
Preamble of the TEU would constitute the big (white) circle (authorisation by
default); the rationale of Article 101(1) TFEU is expressed by the lower
(deontological) part of the middle (black) circle; whereas the rationale of Article
101(3) TFEU is encompassed in the upper (utilitarian) part of the small (grey)
circle. In other words, (1) at the outset, every economic activity is authorised by
default; (2) unless it significantly restricts other important societal values. The
structure of Article 101(1) TFEU enables prohibition of only those agreements
which violate the deontological value of competition; other rules prohibit
violations of other values. The conceptual attempt to expand the scope of
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50 LA Sullivan, “Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for
Antitrust?” (1977) 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1214: “[A]ntitrust scholarship could
usefully explore the styles of analysis and some of the material from the humanistic disciplines of
history and philosophy, and . . . it might be useful to draw upon social sciences other than
economics, particularly on sociology and political science.”
Fig 1 Regulation of Self-destructive Competition
Article 101(1) TFEU into the utilitarian part of the middle circle has been
supported by the Court of First Instance,51 but then fundamentally rejected by
the European Court of Justice.52 Therefore, Article 101(1) TFEU does not deal
with such values as consumer welfare. There exist other mechanisms for the
protection of utilitarian values, which go beyond the scope of antitrust. (3) On
the other hand, the current structure of Article 101(3) TFEU covers only
utilitarian rationales for the reauthorisation of otherwise prohibited agreements.
This paper attempts to demonstrate that this feature constitutes the main
discrepancy between the regulation of the economic aspects of competition and
the regulation of its political and cultural elements. A conceptual amendment of
Article 101 TFEU will be proposed and explained in the following sections,
which would enable the reauthorisation of some anticompetitive practices not
only on utilitarian grounds (as it is the case in Article 101(3) TFEU now), but
also from the deontological perspective currently missing in antitrust, though
present in the regulation of the political and cultural aspects of competition.
H. “FREE SPEECH V HATE SPEECH” = “FREE COMPETITION V
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT”
The relationship between free speech and hate speech—ie speech designed to
promote hatred on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity or national origin53—is
ruled by a dialectical interplay. On one hand, hate speech is prohibited, because
it causes harm both from (i) a utilitarian and (ii) a deontological perspective: (i)
hate speech is detrimental for such societal goods as public morals and equality
and (ii) it threatens freedom of speech, because it can lead to the establishment
of authoritarianism (“Oroboros” scenario) if it is not curbed.54 On the other
hand, hate speech itself is a component of free speech.55 Thus, while
fundamentally belonging to the big regulatory circle, hate speech also falls in the
middle circle of prohibition. The same can be said on the correlation between
free competition and anticompetitive conduct. On one hand, anticompetitive
conduct is prohibited since it harms (i) some economically significant utilitarian
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53 M Rosenfeld, “Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis” (2003) 24
Cardozo Law Review 1523.
54 JT Nockleby, “Two Theories of Competition in the Early 19th Century Labour Cases” (1994) 38
American Journal of Legal History 452: “Many scholars have recognised the dual, paradoxical nature
of competition as both destructive and beneficial. . . . ‘Competition’ plays an operative role in
what Adam Smith called the ‘invisible hand’ that guides the productive engines of the economy.”
55 The same rationale can be developed in respect to the limitation of the political aspects of
competition, by which some parties with eccentric ideologies are not allowed to participate in
elections because they can be detrimental (i) for democracy itself or (ii) for other important societal
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values (the doctrinal mainstream interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU); as well
as (ii) the deontological essence of competition itself (the literal interpretation of
Article 101(1) TFEU). At the same time, anticompetitive conduct is also a part of
free competition. Indeed, however harmful, it remains an expression of free
economic will and it can thus claim its protection at least to some extent. As a
result, anticompetitive conduct simultaneously belongs to the big circle of by
default authorisation, the middle circle of strict prohibition and the small circle
of reauthorisation.
This being said, there still are significant distinctions between antitrust and
free speech and this is the focal point of this paper. Namely, at the level of the
small circle (reauthorisation) legal theory considers both types of harms
(“utilitarian” or welfare-centric, and “deontological” or value-centric), whereas
antitrust deals only with utilitarian forms of harm. In other words, to decide
whether or not a particular expression of hate should be allowed, legal and
political theories consider its positive effects for freedom of speech as well as
other public values. Furthermore, they put a particular emphasis on the positive
effects predominantly related to the deontological aspects of free speech.56 Thus
hate speech is seen as an integral part of free speech and can be reauthorised, in
spite of its negative effects on public morals, due to the intrinsic importance of
freedom.57 In contrast, antitrust analysis confines itself mostly to the eventual
positive effects of anticompetitive practices for such economic values as
consumer welfare, industrial growth and innovation; all values that are external
to competition. It refuses to explore any procompetitive outcomes of anti-
competitive conducts, considering this prima facie paradoxical scenario as
impossible. The reason for this self-limitation is apparently to be found in the
“quantitative”, “equilibrium-based” rationale of the neoclassical economic
approach to antitrust;58 which, unlike legal theory, cannot internalise any
qualitative values and, instead, simply considers them as “known unknowns”.
Hence, the structure of Article 101(3) TFEU takes the form shown in Fig 2 in
which deontological reasons for re-authorisation are missing.
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56 The US doctrine (due to historical reasons) went in this respect as far as distinguishing between
“the right to advocate violence” v “the duty to refrain from incitement to violence” (see Yates v
United States, 354 US 298 (1957)).
57 The most explicit examples with no justification of free speech other than deontological can be
seen in two cases of the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court decision in National Socialist
Party of America v Village of Skokie, 432 US 43 (1977) recognised the right of the National Socialist
Party of America to march in a town inhabitated by Holocaust survivors; the US Supreme Court
decision in Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) recognised the right to promote the Ku Klux
Klan’s ideas.
58 RJ Peritz, “A Counter-history of Antitrust Law” (1990) 2 Duke Law Journal 265:
“[B]ecause the economic logic of price theory has persuaded many of us to accept its claims of
unrivalled precision and logical structure, we presume (or fear) that arguments founded in
social values but not reflected in the current antitrust discourse of economic . . . simply cannot
be adjudicated in a structured way.”
For instance, the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints which
envisage the balancing of inter-brand with intra-brand competition stipulate that
“vertical restraints which reduce inter-brand competition are generally more harmful
than vertical restraints that reduce intra-brand competition . . . [since they] may
significantly restrict the choices available to consumers . . . [and/or] can reduce
innovation in distribution and deny consumers the particular service.”59
By offering a valuable analysis of different empirical techniques which can be
used for balancing of the conflicting societal interests in general, the Guidelines
neither measure nor counterbalance the intensity of these competitive practices.
They do not set up any standard for prioritisation of one kind of competition
which would be based on other criteria than efficiency or consumer welfare.60 In
other words, the Guidelines do not ask how much competition has been limited
by a restrictive conduct on a given market versus how much competition has
been simultaneously generated by this conduct on another market. The
balancing which is offered in the Guidelines concentrates on the measurement of
the impact which the reduction of inter/intra-brand competition would have on
consumers/innovations/industrial growth or market integration (ie the values
which are external to competition itself), not on their impact on the competitive
process.
The structure of Article 101 TFEU conceptually excludes the possibility that
under some circumstances an anticompetitive conduct is capable of bringing
about some positive effects for competition in other relevant markets, thereby
becoming simultaneously anti- and procompetitive. These agreements are either
reauthorised on the utilitarian grounds listed in Article 101(3) TFEU or simply
not considered within the framework of Article 101 TFEU, which goes against
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Fig 2 Article 101(3) TFEU
the letter of the law, since Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits all anticompetitive
agreements. Prima facie the deontological option for the reauthorisation is partly
acknowledged in European legislation61 and soft law.62 However, the conceptual
pattern there also deviates from the assessment and balancing of the essence of
different kinds of competitions to the benefit of the evaluation of their economic
effects on welfare, innovations or industrial growth (considerations that are
external to competition as an independent societal value).
This crucial difference between free speech and economic competition is due
to the fact that the contemporary antitrust doctrine equates harm to consumers
with harm to competition and (the other way around) considers positive effects
for consumers as inherently procompetitive. The ensuing discrepancy is caused
by a regulatory lacuna which the proposed amendment of Article 101 TFEU
will try to fill in.
I. PROCOMPETITIVE ELEMENTS OF ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
The traditional approach to the assessment of the positive outcomes of an
anticompetitive conduct is designed according to the intuitively monistic belief
that the conduct can only be either pro- or anticompetitive.63 This is the only
way for the decision-makers to operate without recognising the existence of an
independent deontological rationale for reauthorisation. Thus according to the
decision adopted in Leegin,64 “Vertical retail-price agreements have either
pro-competitive or anticompetitive effects, depending on the circumstances in
which they were formed” (emphasis added).65 In this respect the doctrine
explicitly equalises anticompetitive effects with harm to the consumers: “The
rule [of reason] distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect
that are harmful to the consumer and those with pro-competitive effect that
are in the consumer’s best interest.”66 However, this presumption is logically
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[2010] OJ L102, 23 April, P 0001–0007.
62 Eg Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra n 59; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra n 60.
63 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty, [2004] OJ C101/08, 11:
“The assessment under Article 81 thus consists of two parts . . . The second step, which only
becomes relevant when an agreement is found to be restrictive of competition, is to determine
the pro-competitive benefits produced by that agreement and to assess whether these
pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive effects.”
64 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877 (2007).
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
contestable.67 The same “either–or” neoclassical logic has been criticised by
Monti.68 Theoretically, the conduct can be both anticompetitive and pro-
competitive at the same time. In some cases this conduct can be proconsumer,
in others consumer-neutral or anticonsumer. Antitrust scholarship tries to solve
this internal conflict by redefining it as an ontological “inconsistency”.
However, this conflict is irresolvable. It has to be incorporated into the theory and
considered as an engine for the evolutionary development of antitrust.
In this context the present paper does not accept the rationale that “[t]he rule
of reason is designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the
market”.69 The essence of the rule of reason and the nature of Article 101(3)
TFEU do not entail the elimination of anticompetitive transactions from the
market but, on the contrary, the immunisation of anticompetitive transactions
from the antitrust sanctions, because the benefits of such transactions outweigh
their negative impact on competition. An agreement which is covered by Article
101(3) TFEU remains anticompetitive on the second (black) level of the model
of three regulatory circles. The purpose of the rule of reason is to reauthorise
otherwise anticompetitive agreements, and inter alia those agreements which
promote competition more than they simultaneously distort it.
Since some anticompetitive practices can have not only pro-industrial, pro-innovation
or proconsumer, but also procompetitive effects, these practices should be seen as
simultaneously anti- and procompetitive. For instance, an agreement of under-
takings on the improvement of standards of goods and services objectively
restricts the rights of some to compete, but at the same time one of its
consequences can improve or intensify the process of competition between the
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67 PJ Hammer, “Antitrust beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge
of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 923: “Under contemporary
doctrine, restraints of trade can be justified if the restraints are ‘pro-competitive’, but what does it
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68 G Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 1060: “From a
neoclassical perspective, the inclusion of Article 81(3) EC makes no economic sense: if an
agreement’s anticompetitive harms are outweighed by its pro-competitive benefits, then the
agreement does not restrict competition at all. Conversely, if an agreement’s pro-competitive
effects (for example in terms of productive efficiency) outweighed by the risks generated by too
much market power (which would reduce consumer welfare) then the agreement as a whole is
anticompetitive. Therefore, Article 81(3) is futile—an agreement either promotes competition (and
is thereby lawful) or suppresses competition (and is thereby unlawful)—the weighing of the pro
and anti competitive aspects of an agreement can be carried out under the first paragraph of
Article 81.”
69 Leegin, supra n 64.
remaining undertakings.70 Along these lines, Article 101(3) TFEU can be
amended as follows:
“The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of
any agreement . . . decision . . . concerned practice . . . which contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods [ie pro-industrial elements] or to
promoting technical or economic progress [ie pro-innovation elements], while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit [ie proconsumer
elements] . . . and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives [ie
individual minimal harm test]; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question
[ie collective minimal harm test71] or protects, strengthens or improves competition within the
internal market.”
In this context the proposed condition should be applied separately from the
previous ones as an alternative to them.
Alternatively a new “Article 101(4) TFEU” can be proposed:
“The provisions of paragraph 1 may be also declared inapplicable in the case of any
agreement, decision, concerned practice which while preventing, restricting or
distorting some aspects of competition within the internal market, simultaneously
protects, strengthens or improves others aspects of competition within the same or
different part of the internal market.”72
The structure of “Article 101(4) TFEU” would take the form shown in Fig 3 in
which only the deontological reasons for reauthorisation are explicitly provided.
Since the proposed changes only supplement and do not erase the current
scope of Article 101(3), the whole structure of Article 101 after the amendment
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70 In its purest form the elements of this model are seen in the North American regulation of sport.
Professional leagues form a de facto cartel with fixed prices, high barriers to entry and strong
individual dependency. These leagues compose a closed association, where no other club is
allowed to enter. However, the intensity of competition between the remaining clubs increases
proportionally to the level of their closed (anticompetitive) co-operation, since the very essence of
sport is contest and rivalry.
71 Art 101(3) TFEU in this context mentions “the same” elimination of competition as Art 101(1)
TFEU does, implying that an agreement can be immunised from antitrust sanctions only if the
elimination of competition which has been established during the Art 101(1) TFEU test was not
substantial. Conversely, the new amendment permits taking into account different components of
competition which were not articulated by means of the Art 101(1) TFEU test and which can
outweigh the negative impact on competition (by the Art 101(1) TFEU test) regardless of whether
the latter has been eliminated substantially or not.
72 The same rationale can be potentially applied to Art 102 TFEU, although the structure of this
article would not require any changes, since its wording is more flexible than that of Art 101
TFEU. If an undertaking abuses its dominant position, an objective justification can be potentially
based on deontological grounds. Instead of referring to technological development or the benefits
for consumers, it can in some cases argue that the practice is beneficial for competition as such.
There are different potential strategies for developing this argument. The specificity of the concept
of abuse still requires a separate theoretical analysis, which goes beyond the limits of this paper.
would take the form shown in Fig 4, where both utilitarian and deontological
grounds for reauthorisation will be potentially available.
In the ideological73 sense, competition in its political, cultural and economic
dimensions is recognised as an important European value, grounded in
well-established conceptions of liberal democracy. In fact, the political
(elections), cultural (free speech) and economic (markets) aspects of competition
constitute the keystone of liberal democracy. Freedom is a non-utilitarian
category. We do not accept competition because it brings us the best of outcomes
by default. Restricting freedom is often more efficient than freedom itself, but that
does not mean that freedom should be compromised every time that it fails to be
efficient. Yet, it does not mean either that freedom can never be compromised
for the sake of efficiency.
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73 The term “ideology” is used in its narrow sense (ie a common denominator of the basic values of a
particular group/society agreed upon by a “social contract”).
Fig 3 “Article 101(4) TFEU”
Fig 4 Article 101(3) and “(4)” TFEU
In the systemic sense, if something is being balanced against something else,
the latter consideration can also include some elements of the former. The
regulator always does it on a higher systemic level. Thus, we protect
equality-based rights by limiting free speech, but at the same time some of
these prohibited free speech practices also receive immunisation from
prohibition, because they bring more to free speech than they take away from
equality rights. Similarly, we protect consumer welfare by limiting free
competition, but at the same time some of these prohibited restrictive practices
are to be protected from prohibition, if they bring more to free competition
than they take away from consumer welfare (or from competition in different
markets).74 Economic competition contains the same systemic features as
political competition (free elections) and cultural competition (free speech).
Unlike economic competition, both political and cultural aspects of
competition already envisage this option.
In the legal sense, the requirements of the amended Article 101 TFEU would
merely concretise the objectives of the EU, which explicitly encompass the idea
that the EU is based upon the values of liberty and democracy. Therefore, in
situations where balancing and compromising of different European values
are inevitable, competition should be seen as a legitimate economic value in its
own right. In addition this option will enable the proper application of Article
101(1) TFEU, since the balancing test will be conducted according to the
wording of the Treaty and not “merely” as a matter of common sense or as a
rule of reason.
Arguably this conceptual proposal can be seen as politically ill timed. Indeed,
it would also require a substantial reassessment of the present antitrust
legislation. The conceptual justification of this approach can still be grounded at
three levels: legal; systemic and political.
PART III
J. THE BALANCING ACT
The idea that competition is an independent value does not mean that it should
be achieved at all costs. It is not a normative but rather a methodological
statement. This paper does not claim that competition should be always
prioritised over consumer welfare. However, it does effectively question the
utilitarian approach to competition for not even allowing the possibility of such a
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74 P Nicolaides, “An Essay on Economics and Competition Law of the European Community”
(2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 15: “[F]irms compete on many different dimensions.
Constraining one or more dimension does not necessarily result in the weakening of overall
competition” (but can be sufficient for Article 101(1) TFEU to be applied).
prioritisation.75 The lack of legal protection in all cases does not diminish the
ontological essence of free competition. Instead, it submits it to the rational
choices of policy-makers. The fact that some values have undergone a certain
limitation due to the priority of other values, a state of necessity or even shear
public ignorance does not mean that they are reduced in their essence.76 This
prioritisation has an ad hoc rather than a systematic nature, which means that
under another set of circumstances another value might be prioritised.77
The set of recognised public goals and interests—competition being one of
them—is too broad to be coherent. Most of them are “merely” incoherent, some
fairly conflicting, whereas others are mutually exclusive. Some regulators are
aware of the dilemmatic nature of such reconciliation; others keep trying to
bring together the whole spectrum of interests and values by casting them into a
uniform and homogeneous system. Each regulator develops its own algorithm of
hierarchical priorities and balances. Traditionally, competition—in its economic,
political and cultural senses—has been highly appreciated in some parts of the
world and, conversely, underestimated and/or oppressed in others.78 It is not the
purpose of this paper to give an opinion on which approach to competition is
the most appropriate for Europe, since the answer appears to be self-evident.
However, this “self-evidence” would be jeopardised were the role of competition
to be totally circumscribed by its effectiveness, as is becoming increasingly the
case nowadays.79
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75 Eg Christopher Townley in his comprehensive and persuasive study on Art 101 TFEU
(C Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) acknowledges that
“competition policy cannot do everything”, and this explains the inevitability of balancing.
However, his observations concentrate the balancing analysis on the conflict between consumer
welfare and economic efficiency (which are considered as the primary goals of antitrust) on one
hand and non-economic, sociopolitical goals (which are sporadically recognised by competition
law too) on the other. This implies that deontological “competition-centric” antitrust is only worth
mentioning from the historical perspective, merely as an evolutionary period in the history of
antitrust, which was de-legitimised by the eloquent phrase of the former EU Commissioner for
competition Karel van Miert that “competition is not an end in itself”. This rationale does not
include the competition-centric aspects of antitrust into the balancing act at all.
76 At least, there is no direct proportionality between the level of regulatory ignorance of a given
value and its internal axiological importance (even for the same regulator).
77 In some cases (eg a “super-injunction” imposed on The Guardian newspaper to report on the
controversial Trafigura case) security concerns prevailed over free-speech interests. In others (eg
the participation of the British National Party in public discussions on the BBC’s Question Time
programme) the interests of free-speech prevail over the interests of tolerance.
78 DJ Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1998), vii:
“Competition is popular—or so it seems. At least politicians and pundits in most places in the
world tend to sing its praises and/or acknowledge its necessity. But what kind of competition
and what is and should be the relationship between the process of ‘competition’ and other
components of societal life? Despite their importance, these questions have been relatively little
explored. Economic interests and ideologies of left and right have often blocked inquiry into
the issues and obscured answers to the questions.”
79 This conceptual conflict has been explored inter alia by Richard Posner (RA Posner, Antitrust Law
(The University of Chicago Press, 2001):
The deontological perception of competition does not imply that it has to be
protected in all cases and at any costs. The main claim of this paper is that
competition should not be predetermined exclusively by an external utilitarian
rationale. The scope of the protected rights and values is too broad and their
absolute protection would paralyse the functioning of society.80 Therefore
tradeoffs are unavoidable.81 Yet, the fact that some right has not been protected
in its entirety does not cancel its validity or its importance for society.
Competition and consumer welfare are two fundamentally important economic
values. Utilitarian thinkers give a bigger priority to welfare, whereas deontol-
ogists place more importance on competition. Not all objectives can be achieved
in their entirety and not all values can be fully protected. Likewise, the very
notion of “prioritisation of everything” is a contradictio in terminis.
K. DIVIDE ET IMPERA
The methodology of separation of different values which is applied in this paper
is conceptually rooted in the theoretical discussion between legal positivists and
natural law theorists. The central problem for this discussion in legal theory is the
relationship between law and morality. Positivists argue in favour of their
conceptual separation; naturalists oppose this claim. This paper attempts to
internalise the approach developed by legal positivists and apply it to the area of
antitrust law. It accepts Kramer’s argument that “[t]hough legality and morality
are of course combinable, they are likewise disjoinable”, that “separability does
not entail separateness”, and that the main contend of the argument about
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“If we assume that antitrust policy is to be shaped by economic analysis of the monopoly
problem, what is the proper treatment of practices that, while monopolistic rather than
competitive, may be more efficient than the competitive alternative? The social costs resulting
from monopoly pricing will sometimes be lower than the cost savings generated by such
pricing. Imagine a market that is so small in relation to the efficient scale of production that a
single firm will have much lower costs than more than one firm—so much lower, indeed, that
the profit-maximising monopoly price is actually below the price that would be charged by
competing firms . . . Social welfare would be greater if the monopoly were permitted than if it
were forbidden, and since, in an economic analysis, we value competition because it promotes
efficiency—that is, as a means rather than as an end—it would seem that whenever monopoly
would increase efficiency it would be tolerated, indeed encouraged.”
80 T Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law: Markets and Public Services (Oxford University Press, 2005) 1:
“We live in a world of markets and rights. . . . One of the most fundamental problems facing
modern law is how to attempt to reconcile the values of markets, rights, and social solidarity and
how to deal with the tensions between them.”
81 J Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 829–30:
“We know not only that principles like ‘maximise total happiness’ and ‘strive to increase
equality’ may conflict when applied to particular cases, but also that rules may sometimes
conflict as well . . . and that they impose obligations which may be overridden in particular
cases by contrary considerations.”
separability is not that “legal requirements and moral requirements must diverge,
but that legal requirements and moral requirements can diverge”.82 The same
methodology is applied in order to separate the deontological meaning of
competition from its eventual utilitarian outcomes: they can indeed coincide,
they are mutually influenced, but this does not mean that they cannot diverge
and therefore be treated as conceptually different phenomena.
There are two ways of reconciling conflicting values (in our case it is a conflict
between competition and welfare). The first is monistic, the second is pluralistic.
According to the monistic approach, all values should be systematised in a
complex hierarchical form. Legal monists claim that values obtain their
coherency by being transformed into legal rules. In this way conflicts between
them disappear, since legal rules are applied with no reservation. This approach
is the most attractive for policy-makers because it eliminates all problems related
to the balancing of conflicting values.83 Legal pluralists claim that this reconcil-
iation is rather illusionary. Both in practice and in theory there will always be
room for conflicts between different rules, because the more complex a legal
system becomes, the bigger is the potential for divergent interpretations. Even
very primitive or very mobile systems of norms cannot avoid discrepancies
between their different parts. These discrepancies are present in all legal systems;
they are natural for law as reflected in HLA Hart’s comments on the “open
texture” of rules.
As argued above, according to legal pluralists, the tensions between various
legal rules are seen as inevitable and, in general, productive. This approach does
not even try to eliminate them. Pluralistic interpretation internalises the conflicts
of values and offers an alternative way of reconciling them. Instead of an
unrealistic attempt to establish a homogeneous hierarchical system, it divides
different values for the sake of their independent analysis. The homogeneity of
the legal system is always taken here as a never-reaching aim and not as a fact.
Following this separation, the values are explored on their own merits. This
operation helps to discover the relevant features of each value. After an internal
analysis, the values are proposed to policy-makers, who should reintegrate them
by deciding which value is to be prioritised over the others, and to what extent.
The decision of policy-makers is inductive in the sense that there is a strong
probability that some different value would be prioritised under different circum-
stances. Unlike the monistic approach, which is a one-step technique, the
pluralistic method is a two-step approach, in which decontextualisation is
followed by recontextualisation.84 These stages are synthetically separated for the
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82 MH Kramer, In Defence of Legal Positivism (Oxford University Press, 1999).
83 According to Habermas (J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996) constitutional rights cannot be balanced.
Otherwise they will lose their normative nature.
84 A decision-making process of the Commission is an example of this dialectical reconciliation.
Thus, each directorate is responsible for its own policy. Internally each is concentrated on the
sake of analytical investigation. In real life their interdependency often prevents
them from being seen separately.
At the first (internal) stage values are explored separately. They constitute
close autopoietic self-sufficient systems.85 Each value internally develops its own
“language” and “currency” and tries to persuade the decision-maker of its
importance (as shown in Fig 5).
The dialogue between the values and the decision-maker takes the form of a
one-way communication: the innovation box claims that any act of the regulator
should protect and promote new innovative ideas; the welfare box constantly
reminds the regulator of the necessity to increase welfare; the federalist box
insists that all policies should include elements of European integration, etc.
Internally all policies are explored in each box separately, they evaluate these
policies according to their own internal merits. This type of out-of-context
internal analysis constitutes the essence of scientific thinking, encompassed into
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specificity of its policy. This enables them to undertake a thorough in-depth analysis of all issues
related to EU competence. In a second round these values are put on the agenda of the
Commission which, as a collective body, decides which societal interest should prevail over the
others in each particular case. Each directorate is interested in prioritising the policy that it is
responsible for. Indeed, at the external level, each value is traded off against all others. No societal
interest is regulated without taking into consideration the resources and capacities of the regulator
as well as the cross-interests of other policies. The list of societal objectives is too broad to be
consistent.
85 N Luhmann, Law as Social System (Oxford University Press, 2004).
Fig 5 Internal Communication
the notion of specialisation, which unlike its practical counterpart is preoccupied
with understanding the problems rather than solving them.
At the second (external) stage each value abandons its natural limits and its
specific “language” and tries to use all available “languages” in order to be
prioritised by the decision-maker (as shown in Fig 6).
If economic competition is not perceived as a value in its own right—as put
forward by the utilitarian vision of antitrust—then competition cannot claim its
societal importance at the internal stage (Fig 7).
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Fig 6 External Communication
Fig 7 The Status of Competition in the Internal Communication
It encourages the regulator to create a universal “language” and “single
currency” or at least to establish a stable “rate” between the different internal
“currencies”. However, at the same time, the internal “language” of each value
which reflects its specificity and uniqueness also appears in its discourse. Hence,
the external “language”, “the regulatory Esperanto”, is not a substitution for the
internal “languages”. They dialectically coexist in both dimensions, constantly
“translating” each other.
The ensuing multilogue between the values and the decision-maker takes the
following form: “innovation is good because inter alia it increases total welfare and
industrial growth  total welfare is good because inter alia it enhances industrial
growth and innovation  industrial growth is good because inter alia it increases
consumer welfare and social cohesion, etc, ad infinitum”.
Therefore at the external stage, under the current regulatory framework,
competition can only claim its societal importance by presenting itself as a tool
to increase such utilitarian values as innovation, industrial growth, consumer
welfare etc (Fig 8). Other values do not have to refer to or even take into account
competition as an independent realm in their attempts to increase their own
regulatory significance (since competition is seen only as an external utilitarian
means to arguably more important ends).
Therefore, the task of this paper is to raise some awareness about the
importance of such internal recognition for competition. It does not claim any
exclusivity for the deontological approach, but merely its coexistence on an equal
footing with the utilitarian approach. In the area of antitrust this can be
achieved only if some space on the regulatory scale is reserved for competition as
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Fig 8 The Status of Competition in the External Communication
a process, as the proposed amendment to Article 101 TFEU stipulates. As
already explained, this proposal does not replace the utilitarian conditions of
Article 101(3) TFEU and does not deprive the decision-maker of its competence
to make choices in the “bounded arbitrariness” framework, since “the provisions
of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable” but they do not have to.
In these circumstances competition cannot expect parity with other
regulatory values which hold their internal recognition from the decision-maker.
In other words, under the current approach procompetitive aspects of
anticompetitive conduct can only be protected when they contribute to the
enhancement of other values by using their own “language” (ie “competition is
good only because it is beneficial for consumers, innovation, growth or
integration). Other values do not have to use the “language” of competition in
order to reaffirm their legitimacy, because the “language” of competition is not
recognised as an autopoietic internal value. For instance, the claim that industrial
growth is good because it increases competition can only be made sporadically.
This situation is not unique to competition. Some other deontological values
encounter similar problems in their own domains. For example, from the law
and economics approach, intellectual property faces the challenge of its
utilitarian legitimisation. Accordingly, it is not enough to hold the right to some
intangible assets. On top of this, an additional justification is required for
property rights on such utilitarian grounds as the protection of incentives to
invest, better distribution of goods, creativity or enhancement of innovation.
From an utilitarian perspective the possession of the right as such does not
suffice.
Fig 8 shows the reason why only the external justification of competition
represents the central part of present-day antitrust analysis, and why the “more
economic approach” dominates current antitrust discourse. Since competition is
refused any claim to internal legitimacy, it cannot expect other values to take into
consideration its significance. As a result, the only way for competition to be
present on the regulatory agenda is to demonstrate its instrumental relevance for
the development of other values and policies. This is more easily achieved by
means of economic than legal analysis, because economics relies on
well-developed quantitative techniques aiming at reducing all incommensurable
values to a single universally understandable “currency”.
L. CONCLUSION
The main substantive claim of this paper is that, apart from its utilitarian, applied,
dimension, competition also deserves to be perceived as an important deonto-
logical economic value. On the methodological side this paper argues that each
value (including competition) has its own internal merits. The reconciliation of
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competition with other values constitutes a central regulatory task. But this task
should not be seen as either the sole or the primary role for the antitrust
scholarship. The reconciliation of values is a political rather than an academic
exercise. The predetermination of the antitrust doctrine merely by politically
sensitive welfare-centric goals diminishes the importance of competition as an
independent value. The task of the “competition box” should be more modest. It
should refocus its attention on the semantics of the term “competition” in order
to provide for this phenomenon sufficient internal scrutiny. All attempts to justify
“consumer-centric”, “integration-centric” or “environment-centric” antitrust
interpretations should be designed and promoted by these respective policies
rather than by competition policies.
This paper calls for a higher level of specification in antitrust. It argues that
antitrust law should primarily address the questions of the protection and
promotion of competition and only explore in an ancillary role the impact of
competition on consumer welfare and other economic or political values. By
applying the methodology developed by legal theory and political philosophy for
the regulation of freedom of speech, it shows on the comparative side that
economic competition can also be seen as an independent value. The utilitarian
assumption that competition is only useful as a means to generate welfare is
contestable and can be dangerous. Its literal interpretation would reveal that we
appreciate welfare more than competition and, if this is the case, competition
will be compromised as soon as we find better ways to generate welfare. This
would undermine the very concept of freedom, paving the way for antitrust
“philistinism”. The one-sided perception of the deontological vision of
competition is not acceptable either. Both utilitarian and deontological
arguments  should  coexist  and  interact  within  the  framework  of Article  101
TFEU, as the proposed amendment envisages.
The claim for competition-centric antitrust should not be understood as a
proposal to diminish the importance of other values, influenced by competition
law. Indeed, sectoral norms do not exist in legal vacuum, but constitute a part of
a broader legal corpus. One might have to accept the possibility that all the
relevant legal disciplines purportedly increase their importance by reinterpreting
the legal meaning of the neighbouring areas. For instance, a norm establishing
criminal responsibility for illegal file-sharing belongs both to criminal law and to
intellectual property law. The “legal identity” of this norm would become even
more multifaceted if, for instance, the file-sharing act has been committed by an
underage, mentally challenged refugee. In this case no less than five areas of law
could claim doctrinal priority, trying to provide their own internal rationale and
discursive narrative concerning the perspective from which the case should be
dealt. The very fact that different societal values try to expand their influence by
using antitrust rules is thus fairly rational. Such a diffusion of legal meanings is
acceptable from the perspective of legal pluralism. However, the problem of
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modern antitrust lies in the fact that the core, competition-centric, meaning of
Articles 101–109 TFEU is becoming barely visible, making way for other societal
values, which apart from their external presence in antitrust also hold some place
in their own internal value-centric “boxes”.
Antitrust has been asked to look “outside the boxes” so often and so persis-
tently that it is about to forfeit its own “box”—competition then becoming as
vulnerable as a snail without its shell. What distinguishes competition policy
from other European policies is that it appears to lose its own merits by
becoming fully subordinated to such external values as consumer welfare.86 The
recalibration of the goals of antitrust policy and the limitation of its ambit to
purely competition-related problems can contribute to filling the current gap
between the conceptual consistency and practical effectiveness of competition
policy.
This paper left aside some important methodological questions of antitrust
analysis—eg the “legal certainty v economic efficiency” dimension of antitrust
methodology which is being intensively discussed in antitrust scholarship but is
not of primary importance for the argument of this paper. It presumes that both
legal and economic techniques can be applied in the separate internal analysis of
the competitive process. Therefore, the deontological vision of competition
should not be seen as an attempt to criticise the “more economic approach”. Its
task is rather to enhance the “more competition approach”. The economic
analysis of law is potentially applicable to the development of the deontological
aspects of competition as well, although traditional legal instruments are still
considered to be more relevant in this respect. It is not the objective of this paper
to claim that competition should prevail over welfare. On the contrary, it only
aims at defending the theoretical possibility of this option. Likewise, it does not
try to develop the notion of competition as such, and it acknowledges that the
idea of competition is no less multifaceted and context dependent than its
consumer welfare counterpart and requires a separate theoretical investigation.
Finally, the re-establishment of the deontological elements of competition
could have significant practical implications. For example, defendants could rely
on an additional criterion for reauthorisation of otherwise prohibited practices.
This would also impel undertakings—and in particular those with significant
market power—to design their commercial activities in a way that could bring
some benefits for the competitive process in other relevant markets. In doing so,
public regulators will de facto share some parts of their duty to protect and
promote competition with private industries without sharing their competence to
intervene. The logic of “Article 101(4) TFEU” does not change the existing
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86 P Lowe, “The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century—The Experience of
the European Commission and DG Competition” (2008) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 6: “In the
Commission’s view, the ultimate objective of its intervention in the area of antitrust and merger
control should be the promotion of consumer welfare.”
format of antitrust regulation, since it neither replaces Article 101(3) TFEU nor
deprives the enforcers of their power to reauthorise agreements and practices
when the arguments of the parties and the objective findings of the cases provide
sufficient grounds to this effect. In this respect, the priority of Article 101(1)
TFEU remains undisputed. More importantly, antitrust regulators would benefit
from an additional leverage to promote the significance of competition policy on
the broader regulatory scale. Antitrust would no longer be perceived only as a
tool which contributes to general public goals, but also as a policy in its own
right, which protects and promotes an independent economic value—the
competitive process. The absence of definitive standards by which practices can
be reauthorised and the apparent complication of the reauthorisation procedure
itself can be seen as shortcomings of this proposal. Yet, both can be easily
mitigated and fine-tuned by the adversarial adjudicative process and the ability
of the parties to put forward persuasive arguments. This proposal is also in
conformity with the broader trend in European antitrust policy to enhance the
private enforcement of competition law, enabling private parties actively to
promote the competitive process in their everyday economic activities.
The deontological acknowledgement of competition as an additional
standard for immunisation from antitrust sanctions should not be seen in its
absolute form. Indeed, none of the existing conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU
(ie benefits for innovations, industrial growth and consumers) are seen in their
absolute form either. The recognition that competition should be seen as an
independent economic value, separated from consumer welfare, does not imply
that utility-based values are less important than deontological ones. The relation
of competition with other important societal interests should take the form of a
par in parem relationship. This “equal among equals” means that European
rule-makers and policy-makers will still have sufficient room for interpretation
and balancing of the conflicting values, in order to decide which should be
prioritised over the others in each particular set of circumstances, and will not be
required to protect or promote exclusively competition at the expense of more
utility-based values. This mitigates suggested changes and makes the conceptual
proposal explored in this paper less controversial and more realistic.
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